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INTRODUCTION 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deeply paradoxical: the basic outline of a 
deal that might better serve the interests of most Israelis and most Palestinians is 
reasonably clear and yet this violent conflict persists.  Since the Camp David ne-
gotiations orchestrated by President Clinton collapsed in the summer of 2000, the 
entire Oslo peace process has disintegrated and in the following four years more 
than 1000 Israelis and 3000 Palestinians have died in renewed violence. 
The essential terms of such a deal are well known.  President Clinton outlined 
them to the parties in December of 2000.
1  It would involve a two state solution.  
There would be arrangements to insure a secure Israel, which would remain a 
democratic Jewish state.  The new Palestinian state would include Gaza and the 
West Bank.  All Jewish settlements would be evacuated, with possible exceptions 
for those very near the “Green Line”
2 or adjacent to Jerusalem.  Those settlements 
might be annexed to Israel in exchange for land that is presently part of Israel and 
other consideration.  Jerusalem would become a condominium of sorts.  Those 
portions of East Jerusalem presently occupied by Palestinians would become the 
capitol of the new Palestinian state, while the Jewish portions of Jerusalem would 
remain the capitol of Israel.  The Palestinian claim that their refugees have a “right 
of return” would be definitively resolved in a way that insured that Jews remained 
a substantial majority in Israel proper. 
___________________________  
*Williston Professor of Law, Director of the Harvard Negotiation Research Project and Chair, Program 
on Negotiation at Harvard University.  This paper is a much-expanded version of the “2004 Distin-
guished Dispute Resolution Lecture” at the University of Missouri delivered by Professor Mnookin on 
April 12, 2004.  The authors wish to thank Karen Tenenbaum and Rich Cooper, Harvard Law School 
students, for their invaluable research assistance.  We also wish to acknowledge the helpful sugges-
tions of Professor Noah Feldman.   
**Visiting Research Scholar, Harvard Negotiation Research Project. 
1 See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
752-753 (2004). 
  2. The “Green Line” was the cease-fire line, established in 1949, that became a provisional border 
between Israel and the territory controlled by Jordan before the 1967 War.  See Fr. Robert J. Araujo, 
S.J., Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion—Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:  Fences [Do Not] Make Good Neighbors?, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
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If the outline of a deal that would better serve the interests of most Israelis 
and Palestinians is so obvious,
3 why has it proven so difficult to make progress 
towards peace?  The most common explanation relates to failures of leadership.  
Many blame the breakdown at Camp David on Yasser Arafat,
4 although Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak and President Clinton are sometimes said to be responsible 
as well.
5  In the years since, some commentators have suggested that the Bush II 
administration bears blame for the lack of progress towards resolution because it 
failed to design a strategy to enable the parties to accept the terms of a deal that 
would appear to serve the interests of both sides.
6 
While we agree that political leadership is a necessary condition for progress 
towards peace, we believe there is a deeper reason for the apparent paradox: there 
are profound internal conflicts among Israeli Jews, on the one hand, and among 
Palestinians, on the other, that stand as barriers to progress at the negotiation table. 
Among Palestinians, this conflict relates to the refugee problem and the meaning 
and scope of any Palestinian “right of return” that would essentially be extin-
guished by the deal.  Among Israeli Jews, the conflict concerns the future of the 
settlements.  A contiguous Palestinian state would encompass many existing Jew-
ish settlements, and as a practical matter displace thousands of Jewish settlers.  It 
would also mark the end of the “settlement project.”  For some religiously obser-
vant Israelis this project was meant to guarantee the fulfillment of a messianic 
desire to include within the Jewish state the cradle of “Eretz Yisrael”
7—biblically 
___________________________  
  3. Two different “third track” unofficial collaborative efforts by Israelis and Palestinians have 
demonstrated that the terms of a beneficial deal remain well known.  Over 100,000 Palestinians and 
150,000 Israelis have signed the Ayalon-Nuseibeh initiative, which spells out the essential principles 
that would provide a foundation for a deal.  Ami Ayalon is a retired Admiral who headed the Israeli 
Navy and served as head of Israel’s internal security agency.  Sari Nuseibeh, a leading Palestinian 
public intellectual, is President of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem.  In a process facilitated by a Swiss 
professor, leading Israelis and Palestinians negotiated the Geneva Accords, an agreement that works 
out in considerable detail all of the final status issues.  The Ayalon-Nuseibeh initiative is available at 
http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).  See also Ami Ayalon & Sari Nuseibeh, 
Finding Common Ground:  The Missing Pieces of Middle East Peace, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 415 
(2004).  To access the Geneva Accord see http://www.heskem.org.il/index_en.asp.  For a Palestinian 
critique of the accord see Haithem El-Zabri, Palestinians Outraged by Geneva Accord, THE PALESTINE 
MONITOR, Oct. 19, 2003, at http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Analysis/palestinians_out 
raged_by_geneva.htm.  For an Israeli critique, see Yaakov Amidror, The Geneva Accord:  A Strategic 
Assessment, ONE JERUSALEM, Dec. 4, 2003, available at http://www.onejerusalem.org. 
 4. See ROSS, supra note 1, at 710. 
  5. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Camp David:  The Tragedy of Errors, NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380.  Compare to responses by Ross and 
Grinstein in Camp David:  An Exchange, NEW  YORK  REVIEW OF BOOKS,  Sept. 20, 2001, at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14529.  See also Jeremy Pressman, Visions in Collision:  What 
Happened at Camp David and Taba?, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 5-43 (2003), at http://muse.jhu.edu/jour 
nals/international_security/v028/28.2pressman.pdf. 
 6.  See Gareth Evans & Robert Malley, Roadblocks on the Path to Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2002, at A35 (claiming President Bush lacked a sufficient plan for comprehensive political settlement 
between Israel and Palestinians); Thomas L. Friedman, A Rude Awakening, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, 
at A31 (blaming the Bush foreign policy team for failing to tailor the peace process to build a moderate 
center Palestinian bloc). Other explanations suggest the possible absence of a bargaining zone between 
the two parties, or mutual hard bargaining.  See Russell Korobkin and Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to 
the Road Map: A Negotiation Theory Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict After Yasser 
Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2005). 
  7. “Eretz Yisrael,” literally “land of Israel.”  Politically, the term means “greater Israel,” those 
areas that were promised to the Jews in the Bible but are not under the sovereignty of the modern state 
 File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
2002]  Article Title 3  
significant parts of the ancient Jewish land.  These internal, “behind the table” 
conflicts interact with, and create problems for, any negotiations across the table 
between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority and explain why it is 
difficult for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to make and implement a comprehen-
sive deal.
8 
Our exclusive focus is on one of these conflicts—the profound internal rift 
among Israeli Jews over the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.  We 
are especially interested in the role of the national religious settlers and the Israeli 
government’s response to them.  These settlers lead the movement and are domi-
nant actors in the internal conflict.  The current controversies within Israel regard-
ing Prime Minister Sharon’s “unilateral initiative,” which was not the product of a 
negotiation with Palestinians, demonstrate the importance of understanding the 
internal conflict within Israel and the dominant role of the leaders of the settle-
ment movement. 
Prime Minister Sharon’s initiative seeks to evacuate the Jewish settlements in 
Gaza as well as four small settlements in the northern part of the West Bank.  If 
implemented, this initiative will displace only 8000 of the 230,000 Jewish settlers.  
Its immediate impact is primarily in the Gaza strip, home to over one million Pal-
estinians, and an area with little, if any, religious significance to Jews.  Although 
polls suggest a majority of Israelis support the withdrawal from Gaza,
9 national 
religious settlers (who make up less than 2% of the electorate) are leading the 
opposition and may well succeed in blocking implementation of the initiative. 
Our essay is organized as follows. In Part I, we briefly describe the settle-
ments today and then outline the two dimensions of internal conflict.  Next, in Part 
II, we review the history of the settlement movement, and show how, in the face 
of opposition, a determined minority (the national religious settlers) promoted and 
vastly expanded the settlements.  In the process, they helped create “facts on the 
___________________________  
of Israel.  The territory that was held under British control (1917-1948) was called “Palestine-Eretz 
Yisrael.” 
  8. These kind of interactions, between across the table negotiations and conflicts among each 
negotiator’s constituents, characterize bargaining in labor relations and international relations, and 
there is academic literature dealing with each.  In a seminal article published in 1988, Robert Putnam, 
building on the work of Walton and McKersy in the labor field, put forth the notion of “Two-Level 
Games.”  Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427, 427-60 (1988).  Putnam emphasizes the idea that the political leaders negotiating 
across the table at an international level are constrained and influenced by the domestic political nego-
tiations in which they are necessarily involved at the same time, he states:  
“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups.  At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.  
Neither of the two games can be ignored . . . .” 
Id. at 434.  The only academic application of Putnam’s theory to the internal conflict within Israel we 
have found is an unpublished paper by Ben Soetendorp, which we discovered after this article had 
been drafted. See Ben Soetendorp, Choosing Stalemate: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics 
and Israeli-Palestinian Bargaining available at http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/soetendorp.html. 
 9.  See Israeli Public Opinion on the Withdrawal from Gaza, ISRAEL POLICY FORUM, May 2004 
(for the results from the Ma’ariv-Teleseker poll and the Peace Index Poll as conducted by the 
Steinmetz Center for Peace Research seeking Israeli public opinion concerning Prime Minister 
Sharon’s disengagement plan), at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/serial.cfm?id=10&Sub=57&dis=1. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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ground”
10 that contributed to the failure of the Oslo process.  In Part III, we will 
offer an explanation for why the national religious settlers have wielded such dis-
proportionate influence.  In Part IV, we will describe Prime Minister Sharon’s 
proposed limited withdrawal and show how the settlers, drawing on their sources 
of influence, are attempting to block any evacuation of settlements.  Finally, in our 
concluding section, we focus on the current conflict over Prime Minister Sharon’s 
proposal and offer suggestions about how the internal conflict might best be man-
aged. 
I.  THE SETTLEMENTS TODAY AND THE NATURE OF THE INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 
A.  The Settlers and Settlements Today 
About 230,000
11 Israeli settlers, out of a total population of some 5 million Is-
raeli Jews, live in 140 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
12 
Often, non-Israelis have a tendency to view all settlers as messianic national-
ists—zealots in the desert wilderness—pursuing a religiously based expansionist 
vision of “Eretz Yisrael,” a Greater Israel.  But the settlers today are a diverse lot 
that can be broken into three reasonably distinct groups.  One group, the religious 
nationalists, is deeply committed to a religiously based expansionist vision.  Al-
though they comprise only about a quarter of the settlers, they make up the vast 
majority of the movement’s institutional leadership. 
Many more settlers—perhaps half of the total—moved to the settlements not 
for any deeply religious or ideological reasons but in order to improve their qual-
ity of life.  They were initially motivated by generous government subsidies and 
the opportunity to acquire better housing in a less densely populated area with 
more open space from which they could still commute to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. 
A third group—about a quarter—are ultra-orthodox Jews (called the 
“Haredim”) who had similar, primarily economic motivations.
13  The Haredim 
have traditionally lived in segregated communities and abstained from participat-
ing in Israeli public life.  Indeed, some have never recognized the existence of the 
___________________________  
  10. The term “creating facts on the ground” was used to describe the early Zionist strategy of estab-
lishing a Jewish presence through pioneering settlements in order to push out the future borders of a 
yet to be established Jewish state.  See generally Abraham d. Sofaer, Jewish Law and the Middle East 
Peace Process, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 319-20 (1999). 
  11. This number does not include the 176,000 Jewish inhabitants of those portions of Jerusalem 
previously in the West Bank that were annexed to Israel in 1968.  See Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab:  
Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, B’TSELEM, May 2002, at http://www.btselem.org/English 
/Publications/Summaries/Land_Grab_2002.asp.  See also Dror Etkes, Director of Peace Now’s Settle-
ments Watch Project, Testimony Before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 4 (Oct. 15, 2003) (transcript available at http://foreign.senate. 
gov/testimony/2003/EtkesTestimony031015.pdf). 
 12.  Etkes,  supra note 11.  Some sources suggest there are in fact about 175 settlements.  In addition 
to 140 recognized settlements, there are at least 105 others, sometimes called “outposts,” that are not 
officially recognized by the Israeli government.  See id.  
  13. Ultra-Orthodox settlers have been the fastest-growing group of settlers in the last few years. In 
2002, 50% of new settlers were from this group.  See Nadav Shragai, Settler numbers are approaching 
the 220,000 mark, HAARETZ, April 10, 2004, at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml 
?itemNo=190545&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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State of Israel; as a rule Haredim are exempt from military service.  For these 
Haredim, the settlements provide a way to create new, low-cost, segregated com-
munities.  Living in the West Bank, at least initially, carried no special signifi-
cance for them.  Over time, however, some of those whose original motivation 
was primarily economic have become more ideologically committed to the settle-
ment project, at least in nationalistic terms.  While the political affiliations of 
these three groups vary, a higher proportion of settlers vote for right-wing parties 
than is true for Israel as whole.
14 
B.  The Nature of the Conflict 
The core internal conflict over the future of the Jewish settlements has two 
dimensions.  First, the settlements pose a concrete political question: what should 
Israel do with the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza?  The conflict 
over this question has profoundly affected Israel’s internal politics.  It also illus-
trates the interaction between internal politics “behind the table” and negotiations 
“across the table” because its outcome will obviously affect any future negotia-
tions between Israelis and Palestinians.  It is safe to assume that all three groups of 
settlers would strongly prefer that their own settlement ultimately become part of 
Israel proper—few would vote to support their own forced evacuation. 
The second dimension goes to the nature of Israel and the meaning of a Jew-
ish state.  It implicates the core identity of some, but not all, the protagonists.  This 
dimension raises the following sorts of questions:  What role should religion play 
in public life?  In a democracy, can the “sacred” override state sovereignty?  By 
what process should decisions over these issues be made? 
In a brilliant essay written two decades ago, Amos Oz suggested that the in-
ternal conflict among Israelis over the settlement project implicated these sorts of 
issues.  He wrote, in words that ring true to us today:  
“Hundreds of thousands of Israelis are convinced, intellectually and emo-
tionally, that if Israel keeps hold of the occupied territories it will cease 
to exist—nothing less than that.  Hundreds of thousands of other Israelis 
are convinced that if Israel pulls out, it will cease to exist—nothing less 
than that . . . Both sides are armed with precedents and expert opinions, 
indications that appear to them infallible.  Both sides sense an imminent 
catastrophe.  Both sides share a sense of emergency.”
15 
___________________________  
  14. If one were creating a typology of settlements, rather than types of settlers, one might use three 
categories:  (1) “Political Settlements” created for ideological reasons where national religious settlers 
live; (2) “Residential Settlements,” inhabited by either by “quality of life” settlers or the Haredim; and 
(3) “Security Settlements” created for purposes of Israeli security. These would include the settlements 
in the Jordan Valley that were part of the Alon plan (discussed infra Part II.A) and those on the Golan 
Heights. For the most part the settlers living in these settlements are not religious nationalists. 
 15.  Amos  Oz,  Whose’ Holy Land?  Divided Israel in Palestine, in ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND PEACE:  
ESSAYS 78-82 (1995). File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
6  JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION  [Vol.  
1.  The West Bank, Gaza and Israel’s Future Borders 
The settlement project goes to the question at the heart of the most significant 
internal Israeli political conflict of the last three decades:  What should be the 
permanent status of the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza?  Although 
Israel has controlled the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, their final status has not 
been decided and they have never legally been made a part of Israel proper.  De-
ciding how to answer this question has created an internal fault-line between the 
Israeli right and the left since the 1970s.  The right has traditionally supported 
retaining the territories for a combination of national security, cultural and reli-
gious reasons.  In their view Israel needs to expand eastwards in order to create a 
more defensible border as well as protect the country’s water supplies.
16  The 
West Bank is also viewed as the historical cradle of Jewish civilization and an 
essential part of the Promised Land.  Despite these views, however, the right never 
annexed the territories when it was in power. 
Left-wing Israelis believe that Israel should aim to relinquish control over 
these areas for strategic, demographic and moral reasons.  Strategically, the left 
has argued that the occupied territories should ultimately be traded in return for 
peace with the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbors.
17  The left has also em-
phasized the adverse long-term demographic consequences of annexing the occu-
pied territories:  Israel could not remain a democracy with a Jewish majority.  The 
left has further argued that Israel’s continuing domination over Palestinian areas is 
both immoral and would in the long run corrupt and coarsen Israel itself. 
Since the late 1970s, on the Israeli left, “Peace Now” has led the efforts to 
halt the expansion of settlements.
18  Dror Etkes, a Peace Now staffer, indicated in 
2003: 
[P]eace Now has always thought that settlements in the occupied territo-
ries threaten our existence as a Jewish, democratic state, weaken the se-
curity of Israel, drain our economic resources, undermine our society’s 
moral fiber, and serve to perpetuate Israeli rule over another people in a 
way that prevents Israel from reaching peace with the Palestinians.  The 
settlements today pose an existential threat to the future of Israel.  Let me 
be very clear:  it is in Israel’s own best interests to separate itself from 
settlements and the occupied territories that the settlers would have us 
bind to the state.
19 
The settlement project was designed to affect the outcome of this territorial 
conflict through the creation of “facts on the ground.”  The vision of the national 
religious settlers was to create a thick network of Jewish settlements in the West 
___________________________  
  16. We will discuss these claims in greater detail later in the paper, as they are part of the resonance 
of the settler’s appeal in the eyes of the Israeli public.  
  17. Initially, most Israelis thought the West Bank would be returned to Jordan.   
  18. Peace Now, which claims to be Israel’s largest non-governmental movement, was founded in 
1978 and currently runs a “Settlement Watch” project to both monitor and protest the building of 
settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  For more information, see the Peace Now website, 
at http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=43 (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
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Bank and Gaza in order to prevent the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from 
these areas.  Once there were a sufficiently large number of settlers, it would be-
come impossible for any Israeli government to require massive numbers of ordi-
nary Israelis to relocate.  Meir Harnoi, a dominant figure in the early years of the 
settlement movement, explicitly admitted as much:  “The renewal of the Jewish 
settlements in the complete land of Israel was a move with one goal in mind: keep 
Eretz Yisrael from foreign rule.”
20 
 
2.  The Settlements and the Nature of the Jewish State 
The conflict over the settlements implicates more than the concrete internal 
debate about territorial expansion.  It raises profound issues about the nature of the 
Jewish state, and the personal identities of some of the protagonists.  One such 
issue relates to Israel’s national identity as a democratic Jewish state.  Since Is-
rael’s birth in 1948 there has been an inherent but manageable tension between the 
nation’s universalistic, democratic norms and its particularistic affiliation with 
Judaism and Zionism.  In its fifty-year history, Israel accommodated this tension 
by encouraging the development of both a democratic culture and one where Jew-
ish holidays and symbols had a preferred status.  In addition, there were special 
immigration rules, the “Law of Return,” that gave every Jew the right to immi-
grate to Israel and become an Israeli citizen.
21  Because Jews represent about 80% 
of Israel’s total population, they are a dominant majority in the state.
22  Although 
20% of Israel citizens are Palestinians, the “Jewishness” of the public sphere and 
national culture has been maintained while according its Arab citizens full right to 
participate in Israeli political life. 
If the settlement project leads to the annexation of the occupied territories, Is-
rael will be faced with hard choices.  What is to be the status of the millions of 
Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and Gaza?  Resolving this issue impli-
cates the tension between maintaining Israel as a Jewish state and as a democratic 
state.  In order to maintain a Jewish electoral majority, even in the short run, Pal-
estinians in the occupied territories cannot be given full voting rights.  This would 
obviously undermine Israel’s democratic character.  But if Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza become equal members in the Israeli body politic, Israel 
would soon lose its Jewish majority,
23 and as a result its Jewish national identity 
would be jeopardized. 
The conflict over the settlements also implicates contentious issues about the 
role of religion in the public life.  The national religious settlers base their deter-
mination to annex the occupied territories on a religious claim that the land is 
sacred, and that their project involves a religious calling to populate the “Promised 
___________________________  
 20.  MEIR HARNOI, THE SETTLERS, Tel-Aviv: Maariv 1994.p.225 (in Hebrew). 
  21. In its present form, the Law of Return has a very expansive definition of who is counted as a 
Jew.  LAWS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: THE LAW OF RETURN (Isr.), at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/spec 
ial/eng/return.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). 
  22. Central Intelligence Agency, Israel, WORLD FACTBOOK, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications 
/factbook/geos/is.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
 23.  Arnon  Sofer,  Demographics in the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute, Washington Institute:  Special 
Policy Forum, March 22, 2002, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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Land” and redeem God’s promise to the Jewish people.  Many national religious 
settlers broadly call for the infusion and imposition of traditional religious norms 
(as opposed to Jewish cultural norms) throughout Israeli public life.  One settler 
suggested recently that Israel should develop a “third temple culture” that fuses 
religion with all aspect of the modern state.
24  For Israeli Jews with a secular, non-
religious orientation, such notions are profoundly repugnant. 
For some protagonists, the internal conflict over the settlements poses pro-
found issues of personal identity.  For the first generation of national religious 
settlers, the project gave their life meaning by defining their role in the chain of 
Jewish history and representing their unique generational contribution to Judaism 
and Zionism.  For such settlers, dismantling their settlements would be a direct 
challenge to their personal identities.  Some scholars have suggested that a col-
lapse of the settlement project might push some settlers to relinquish their reli-
gious fervor or even turn suicidal.
25 
As evident from the Amos Oz quote above,
26 this conflict also poses profound 
issues of identity for liberal Israelis (whether secular or religious) who are com-
mitted to Israel’s democratic nature.  One observant Israeli academic summed up 
his concerns quite vividly: 
If the map of the settlements will establish the border of the sovereignty 
of the State of Israel, this will bring about a situation for the next genera-
tion in which a Jewish minority will oppress and will go on oppressing 
an Arab majority with everything that entails in daily life.  For me this 
would mean that Israel is a state that wasn’t worth establishing; a state 
that is a disgrace for the Jewish people and for the Bible.
27 
Finally, the conflict over the settlements poses process issues, relating to po-
litical legitimacy.  By what process should decisions about the future of the set-
tlements be made?  Religious nationalists base the legitimacy of their claims in 
part on the sacred; some suggest this gives them the right to disregard, in effect, 
the secular political process.  Some have suggested that even if the vast majority 
of Israeli Jews agree to abandon the territories, it will be an illegitimate act be-
cause of the sacred nature of the land of Israel and the obligations of Jews to oc-
cupy it.
28  The left, on the other hand, believes that the state has complete sover-
eignty to make these kinds of decisions through ordinary political processes.   
Their commitment reflects a belief in both democratic and rational decision-
making.  Most see Zionism as a national, secular movement; they reject using 
religious rituals or beliefs as the basis for government policy.  They believe that 
modern secular, not ancient religious, norms should determine the fate of the Jew-
___________________________  
  24. Motty Karpel, The Emunic Revolution:  The Decline of Zionism and the Rise of the Emunic 
Alternative, Lehathila: Alon Shvut, 2003, p. 73 (in Hebrew). 
  25. Gideon Aran, “Anthropological-Historical Notes on the Hard Core Israeli Settlers in the Territo-
ries Towards Possible Evacuation,  Presentation at Harvard Law School’s “Past, Present, and Future of 
the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Settlements:  The Internal Israeli Conflict” (Oct. 14-
15, 2004). 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
  27. Interview with Moshe Halbertal, Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, (Apr. 14, 2004). 
  28.  Elyakim Haetzni, Mishal Am, NFC, Sept. 24, 2004, available at 
http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-7425-00.html?tag=8-10-01.  File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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ish people.  A leading Israeli philosopher summed this up when he suggested that 
the current debate about Prime Minister Sharon’s proposal is “not typically cast by 
the settler movement in terms of whether it is right or wrong as a matter of policy 
or wise politics, but instead is cast in terms of jurisdiction:  whether Israel as a 
state has the sovereign power to decide it?  Is there a legitimate process that can 
adjudicate the conflict?”
29  In his view the settlers suggest that “elected govern-
ment officials lack the jurisdiction to decide these issues and that relocation of 
settlers poses issues of religious law beyond the capacity of the state to decide.”
30 
II.  THE GROWTH OF THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE INTERNAL ISRAELI 
DEBATE 
Before Israel’s surprising victory in the Six Day War in 1967, there was no 
domestic political pressure to expand the boundaries of the state.  In the years 
following the establishment of Israel in 1948, one right wing party—Herut—
voiced the rhetorical aspiration that the Jewish state should someday extend to the 
“two banks” of the Jordan River, but this notion was viewed by an overwhelming 
majority of Israelis as implausible and foolish.  Immediately after the 1956 war, 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion initially staked out a claim for the Sinai and Gaza, but 
under international pressure the Israeli government relinquished its occupation 
and control within a matter of weeks.  The impetus to claim and settle the West 
Bank and Gaza arose only after Israel’s surprising victory in the Six Day War. 
The Six Day War’s outcome elated Israelis, and laid the foundation for a fun-
damental change in territorial attitudes.  Israel suddenly found itself occupying a 
vast, unexpectedly enlarged territory that carried emotional significance for some 
Israelis.  The years that followed saw the emergence of various political and reli-
gious movements that called for expansion into these occupied territories. 
The first expansionist step involved Jerusalem.  Immediately after the war, Is-
rael annexed East Jerusalem and thereafter steps were taken to encourage Jews to 
move into these newly annexed neighborhoods.  There was a broad consensus 
among Israeli Jews that an undivided Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel.  By 
1977, less than a decade later, 50,000 Jews had moved into the newly annexed 
parts of the city; today there are over 150,000.  Among Israelis Jews, this annexa-
tion and settlement has never been controversial.  Today there is a widely shared 
belief that these new Jewish neighborhoods would remain part of Israel in any 
“two-state” deal.
31 
The internal conflict has always centered on settlement activities in the West 
Bank and Gaza.  These can best be understood by distinguishing three time peri-
___________________________  
  29. Moshe Halbertal, National Religious Ideology’s Challenge to Israel’s Sovereignty, Presentation 
at Harvard Law School’s Past, Present, and Future of the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza Settlements:  The Internal Israeli Conflict” Conference (Oct. 14-15, 2004). 
 30.  Id. 
  31. While the manner in which Jerusalem would be divided was a contentious issue during the 2000-
2001 Taba negotiations, it appears that the Palestinians were prepared to accept the reality of Israeli 
control of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  See Miguel Moratinos, European Union Envoy to 
the Middle East, Description of the Outcome of Permanent Status Talks at Taba (2001), at 
http://www.ariga.com/treaties/taba.shtml (report was originally published by Haaretz). File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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ods.  The first period was between 1967 and 1977 during which the Labor Party
32 
was in power and there was limited settlement activity.  During this period, the 
government was generally resistant to settlement, and much of the activity was 
unauthorized.  The second period began in 1977 with the ascendancy of the Li-
kud
33 Party and extended until 1992 when Labor regained power.  After a cautious 
start, the governments during this period became actively involved in promoting 
the expansion of settlements.  The third period has run from 1992 until the pre-
sent.  During this period (which includes the Oslo peace process) under Labor and 
Likud alike there has been a substantial expansion in the number of settlers with 
limited creation of new settlements. 
A.  1967-1977 Settlement Activities 
During this initial period, the Israeli government essentially viewed the terri-
tories as a “bargaining chip” that would some day be traded for recognition and 
peace.
34  Nonetheless, some limited settlement activities were authorized based 
primarily on national security considerations.  Labor also authorized the “reestab-
lishment” of three settlements on sites populated by Jews earlier in the 20th cen-
tury, prior to Israel’s establishment.
35  Some within the government opposed, as a 
matter of principle, even this limited activity. 
In the aftermath of the Six Day War, a Ministerial Committee on the Settle-
ments was formed, chaired by Yigal Alon.  He developed what became known as 
the “Alon Plan” which involved the creation of a string of small settlements along 
the valley of the Jordan River to provide an eastern line of defense.
36 
Other settlements were begun contrary to government policy, often under 
false pretenses, by right-wing national-religious activists who claimed to be living 
in temporary “work camps” or on archaeological excavations.
37  The most influen-
tial movement promoting early settlement in the West Bank was Gush Emunim—
Bloc of the Faithful—a right-wing national-religious movement formed in 1974.
38 
This movement reflected a fusion of religious and Zionist
39 ideologies, and 
was based on the theology of two charismatic rabbis, Avram Isaac Kook and his 
___________________________  
  32. Labor is Israel’s center-left political party. The party was in power from 1933 (as a pre-state 
political institution) until 1977 and then again from 1992-1996 and 1999-2001.  Since the 1970’s, it 
has supported trading land for peace with regard to the West Bank and Gaza. 
  33. Likud is Israel’s center-right political party.  It was created in 1973 as a union between a number 
of opposition parties, the most important one being Herut, a nationalistic right-wing party.  Likud rose 
to power in 1977 when it was able to effectively channel the resentment of many sectors of Israeli 
society towards the long-ruling Labor Party. Since then it has been continually in power with the 
exception of 1992-1996 and 1999-2001. 
 34.  Lein,  supra note 11, at 11. 
 35. See generally id. 
 36. Id. at 12. 
 37. Id. at 13 (discussing tactics used by Gush Emunim). 
 38. Id.  
  39. Zionism is a political movement established in the late 19th century which was aimed at promot-
ing the Jewish people as a nation and establishing a Jewish state.  The ideological content and meaning 
of Zionism has been contested for over 100 years.  See Shlomo Avineri, Varieties of Zionist Thought, 
Tel Aviv, Am Oved/Ofakim, 1980 (in Hebrew).  NOTE TO AUTHOR:  I think this is a book pub-
lished in 1980 – see http://student.cs.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/archive/archives/monographs/article 
0008147.html for the paper I am using for information. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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son Tzvi Yehuda Kook.
40  Gush Emunim was comprised largely of politically and 
religiously energetic youths who belonged to the National Religious Party, but 
were disappointed by their party’s limited role in shaping the Israeli public 
sphere.
41  This movement aspired to incorporate all of the territories into “Eretz 
Yisrael” as an expression of its dual mission:  devotion to a religious mandate—
the Promised Land—that is a necessary condition to the coming of the messiah; as 
well as a suggestion that the “new frontier” is a way to revive Zionism, a move-
ment that was in the process of decline in their eyes.  The settlement project 
sought to guarantee that all parts of “Eretz Yisrael” will be incorporated as an 
integral part of the state of Israel.  The first set of principles published by Gush 
Emunim in 1975 states that “we have to make it unequivocally clear to ourselves 
[Israelis] and the nations of the world that the people of Israel are fully committed 
to opposing any attempt to force upon them a withdrawal, through political or 
military means, from parts of Eretz-Yisrael.”
42 
The movement’s original goals were wider than simply creating “facts on the 
ground” in order to bring about Israeli territorial expansion.  Its original list of 
principals included expansion of national and religious education, unity of the 
Jewish people, support for Jewish immigration to Israel, political and economic 
independence from foreign powers, and an activist foreign policy.  Yet, by the late 
1970s the movement essentially focused on a single mission:  settling the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Gush Emunim set up a “settlement department” called 
Amana (Covenant).  By the early 1980s Gush Emunim disintegrated as a political 
movement, but its settlement arm—Amana—remained active and has since played 
a crucial role in the expansion of settlements. 
From 1974-1976 successive Labor governments worked to restrain the set-
tlement activities of Gush Emunim.  For example, at the same site near Nablus the 
Gush Emunim activists made seven attempts to establish a settlement, and the 
government removed them in each instance.
43  But on the eighth try they suc-
ceeded—due to internal rift between Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres within the 
Labor Party, a compromise was struck.  The settlers were allowed to reside at a 
neighboring military base which they subsequently transformed into a civilian 
settlement.
44 
By 1977, when the Labor government left power, 4500 Israelis lived in 36 
settlements—31 in the West Bank and five in the Gaza strip—that had been estab-
lished either on the government’s initiative or with its acquiescence.
45 
___________________________  
 40.  See Lein, supra note 11, at 13.  The father, Avram Isaac Kook (1864-1935), was a dominant 
religious authority who saw Zionism, even when led by non-religious Jews, as a movement that serves 
religious values. He argued that a secular state is the beginning of Jewish redemption.  His son, Tzvi 
Yehuda Kook (1890-1981), also a rabbi, carried on his work. 
  41. Gideon Aran, From Religious Zionism to a Zionist Religion:  The Roots of Gush Emunim and 
its Culture (1987) (Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University) [hereinafter Aran, Dissertation]. 
 42.  GERSHON SHAFAT, GUSH EMUNIM 360 (1995). 
 43. See Lein, supra note 11, at 13. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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B.  The 1977 Watershed: The Rise of Likud 
In 1977, the Likud Party broke the Labor Party’s long-term political monop-
oly and formed its first government.  Likud was committed to an expansionist 
ideology that suggested that Israel should include not only the West Bank, but also 
most of Jordan.  However, this position was a minority one until 1977.
46  The 
1977 elections brought to power people who were sympathetic to Gush Emunim’s 
dream that the Jewish state should include all of the Land of Israel.  While many 
in Likud shared an expansionist vision, Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s gov-
ernment was initially cautious.  Comparatively few Israelis were persuaded by 
Gush Emunim’s religious justification, and many secular Zionists (including some 
members of Likud) were concerned that the conspicuous expansion of settlements 
would damage Israel’s international standing. 
Ariel Sharon championed the expansion of the settlements.  In the first Likud 
government, from 1977-81, Sharon became Minister of Agriculture and used that 
post to design his own long-range plan for expansion.
47  Sharon was motivated by 
a non-religious, expansionist vision.  His initial goal was to “erase” the Green 
Line with settlements.
48  While Gush Emunim and similar organizations were able 
to attract nationally and religiously motivated settlers, Sharon went to great 
lengths to attract the general public to the settlement project.
49  By 1981 the num-
ber of West Bank settlers nearly quadrupled to over 16,000.
50 
Likud won a second victory in 1981 and during its second administration 
(1981-1984) the settlement project greatly expanded and was further institutional-
ized.  Begin’s successor as prime minister, Itzhak Shamir, was committed to a 
vision of greater Israel and was willing, perhaps even more than Begin, to expose 
Israel to international condemnation in order to expand the settlements.  Govern-
ment agencies were deeply involved in planning and implementing the creation 
and expansion of settlements.  During this period, mainstream non-governmental 
Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organiza-
tion actively participated.
51  This meant that the expansion of settlements was 
transformed from an essentially entrepreneurial activity led by a fringe group into 
a mainstream endeavor that provided substantial subsidies to encourage Israelis to 
move to settlements.  Even more striking is the fact that between 1984 and 1990, 
although Labor participated with Likud in two successive national unity govern-
ments, the expansionist policies persisted.  During those years, the number of 
West Bank settlers increased from 35,000 to more than 78,000.
52 
During this period the Israeli governments actively sought to erase the dis-
tinction between Israel proper and the occupied territories.  For example, the Min-
___________________________  
  46. Yonathan Shapira, Chosen to Command:  The Road to Power of the Herut Party 87, Tel-Aviv, 
Am Oved, 1989. 
 47. See Lein, supra note 11, at 14. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 18 (Table 2, citing Central Bureau of Statistics). 
  51. The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization were Zionist organizations created 
before 1948 that served as the institutional foundation for the state of Israel.  Since the state of Israel 
was established, as quasi-governmental organizations they have remained deeply involved in facilitat-
ing Jewish immigration and settlement activities. 
 52.  Lein,  supra note 11, at 18 (Table 2, citing Central Bureau of Statistics). File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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istry of the Interior began referring to the territories as “Judea and Samaria” in 
official announcements, and changed the Hebrew word for “settlement” in gov-
ernment publications and documents from a neutral word to one evocative of Bib-
lical claims of redemption.
53  Once again the Labor Party was complicit.
54  But 
Labor and Likud, Israel’s two major parties during this period, had different long-
term goals regarding the settlements.  Labor publicly expressed willingness to 
trade land for peace, thus implicitly anticipating an offer to remove settlements as 
a bargaining chip in some future peace negotiations with an Arab partner.  Likud, 
on the other hand, while never prepared to annex the territories, became implicitly 
committed to a vision of a greater Israel. Likud sought to create “facts on the 
ground” in the territories through an ambitious government sponsored settlement 
project so that no future Israeli government would politically be able withdraw 
from the West Bank as part of an overall settlement. 
C.  1992-Present:  Settlement Expansion During Oslo and Beyond. 
In 1992 Labor came to power again, led by Yitzhak Rabin who promised to 
reduce significantly the amount of governmental resources going to settlements.
55  
In September 1993, after a few months of secret negotiations, Israel and the PLO 
signed a declaration of principles that outlined a process over a period of years 
that would lead to a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Oslo 
was premised on the notion of land for peace.
56 
Implicit in this agreement was the notion that Jewish settlements would be 
dismantled.  Moreover, as part of the Oslo process, Israel later officially commit-
ted in 1995 not to “initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotia-
tions.”
57  The Labor government also promised to the United States that it would 
not establish new settlements or expand existing ones, except, if necessary, to 
accommodate the “natural growth” of the local population.
58  Ironically, during 
the 1990s—a decade dominated by the Oslo process—the number of West Bank 
settlers grew from 78,000 to nearly 200,000.
59  Much of this expansion occurred 
under three Labor governments, none of which stopped the expansion.
60 
___________________________  
  53. The original word, “Yeshuvim,” was used in the early phases of Zionist settlement in Palestine, 
and did not have religious overtones.  The new word, “Hitnahluyot,” was used in the Bible to describe 
the settlement process by which the Israelites reclaimed their land after being slaves in Egypt. 
  54. Indeed, as early as 1969 no official Israeli maps had the Green Line on them, and the terms 
“West Bank” and “occupied territory” were not used on state radio. 
 55.  Lein,  supra note 11, at 15. 
  56. This principle—that first appeared in the 1967 United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 
242—governed the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, underlined the Israeli-Syrian peace nego-
tiations from 1992 onwards, and was to serve as the basis of the final status agreement between Israelis 
and Palestinians in the Oslo process.  UN SCOR, Res. 242, 22d Sess., at 8, UN Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 
(1967).   
  57. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), Sept. 28, 
1995, Chap. 5, Art. 31(7). 
 58.  Lein,  supra note 11, at 15-16. 
 59. Id. at 18 (Table 2, citing Central Bureau of Statistics). 
 60. On March 9, 2005, the Israeli government released a report compiled by Talia Sasson, a former 
Israeli prosecutor, which confirmed that at least some of the outposts were established, maintained, and 
grown with government financial support. See Ben Lynfield, Israel’s Aid to Illegal Settlers, CHRISTIAN 
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During the Rabin period, the government’s internal guidelines suggested 
there would be no new settlements, only “natural growth.”
61  But the guidelines 
made an exception for new settlement construction in “the Greater Jerusalem area 
and in the Jordan Valley.”
62  The Labor government also created semantic loop-
holes by expansively interpreting all of these terms:  “Greater Jerusalem” was 
construed quite liberally.
63  “Natural growth” was vague enough to allow Israel to 
build thousands of new housing units without provoking a public rebuke from the 
United States government.
64  A number of settlements were constructed as “new 
neighborhoods” of already-existing ones.
65  In fact, between 1993 and 2001, the 
number of housing units in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (excluding East 
Jerusalem) rose from 20,400 to 31,400—54% in eight years, and the most signifi-
cant increase took place under Ehud Barak in 2000.
66 
It is interesting to speculate about why the Labor government permitted this 
expansion.  Rabin, Peres and Barak all were prepared to trade land for peace, and 
they must have recognized that expanding the number of settlers would compli-
cate their domestic challenge in ratifying any deal.  The most obvious explanation 
is that they chose to avoid and defer, until a deal was in the offing, the crisis they 
knew would ensue when the settlers were confronted.  Bureaucratic inertia may 
have also played a role and there was a substantial apparatus—public and pri-
vate—involved in the expansion.  By avoiding conflict, the government traded 
long term negotiating flexibility for short term political stability. 
There can be little doubt that the expansion of the settlements in general, and 
the vehement opposition of national religious settlers to the Oslo process, contrib-
uted to Oslo’s eventual failure.  The continued expansion during the process 
surely contributed to a Palestinian perception that the Israelis were not committed 
to a two-state solution but were just playing for time while irreversible facts were 
being created on the ground.  This, after all, was the stated goal of Gush Emunim.  
For many Palestinians ongoing settlement activity was visible evidence that the 
Zionists intended the continuing expropriation of Palestinian lands.  Even those 
Palestinians who were convinced that many within Israel were prepared to give up 
the settlements might conclude that the Israeli government lacked the capacity to 
confront the settlers. 
Apart from their impact across the table, the settlers became potent political 
actors within Israel.  The settlers, especially the national religious element, had 
become one of the most effective forces in Israeli politics regarding the internal 
debate over the prospects of an Israeli-Palestinian peace.  Rabin’s death no doubt 
slowed the Oslo process, and some within Israel blame the inflammatory rhetoric 
___________________________  
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2004, at 1. The report claims that the Housing Ministry provided mobile 
homes and money to outposts, and that the military allowed 54 outposts to be constructed on private 
Palestinian land.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 15-16.  A policy of natural growth would mean that the only new construction would 
accommodate young settlers choosing to remain in their settlement but who want to leave their par-
ents’ homes. 
 62. Id. at 15-16 (citing to the Alon Plan).  Greater Jerusalem is an area of 440 square kilometers that 
comprises the inner metropolitan core around Jerusalem beyond the Green Line. 
 63. See id. at 16. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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of some settlers as a contributing factor in his assassination, although the assassin 
himself was not a settler.  The settlers also launched a political offensive that led 
to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s resignation after he signed an agreement 
with the Palestinians (the Wye River memorandum) in late 1998 committing Is-
rael to relinquishing control of additional portions of the West Bank.  Moreover, it 
must be noted that during the Camp David talks in 2000, Prime Minister Barak 
had lost a governing majority, though the settlers had only a limited direct role in 
that development. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE EXPANSION OF THE SETTLEMENTS—WHY DO 
THE SETTLERS HAVE DISPROPORTIONATE POWER? 
Less than 5% of the Jewish population of Israel resides in settlements, and the 
ideologically committed national religious settlers are only about a quarter of 
those settlers.  Nevertheless, the history of the last thirty years has demonstrated 
that this small group has wielded disproportionate influence on domestic politics 
and Israel’s international relations.  The number of settlers has expanded almost 
continuously under both Labor and Likud governments.  Governments have been 
threatened and even brought down.  Within Israel it has been politically risky for a 
political figure even to talk  about evacuation of settlements.  Taking concrete 
steps towards this end contributed to the downfall of the Rabin, Netanyahu and 
Barak governments and now threatens Sharon’s government.  What is the origin 
and nature of this influence?  Why have settlers in general—and the national reli-
gious contingent in particular—succeeded in making the future of the settlements 
into the third rail of Israeli politics?  And more broadly, what factors (unrelated to 
actions of the settlers) contributed to the successful expansion of the settlements. 
In the pages that follow we will identify three sources for the disproportionate 
influence of the national religious settlers:  (a) their ability to sound themes that 
have religious and ideological resonance with broad appeal within Israel; (b) the 
institutional structure of the governmental entities representing the settlers and the 
peculiar influence minority parties can play within Israeli politics; and (c) the fear 
created within Israel by the settler’s willingness to use hard-bargaining tactics, 
including civil disobedience and the threat of violent protest.  We then go on to 
suggest four other reasons—not related to actions of the settlers—that contributed 
to the expansion.  These are:  (a) considerations relating to national security; (b) 
the lack of clarity about whether there was an Arab entity with whom to negotiate 
that was prepared to accept responsibility for the West Bank; (c) a desire to create 
incentives for possible future negotiations with Arab or Palestinian representa-
tives; and (d) the economic benefits to Israel’s economy of retaining the occupied 
territories. 
A.  The Settlers Can Sound Themes Having Broad Resonance within Israel 
Ideologically committed settlers have had surprising influence because of 
their ability to sound themes and create images that have deep resonance among a 
much broader group of Israeli Jews who may be less religious or nationalist than 
the settlers.  Some of these themes are biblical, and connect the West Bank to the 
ancient homeland of the Jewish people; others are more explicitly religious, and File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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suggest redemption through the settlement of the ancient homeland.  Many of 
these themes echo sentiments voiced by secular Jews who laid the foundation for 
the modern state.  These include the rebirth of the Jewish people through a pio-
neering spirit; the importance of strong solidarity within communities consisting 
of mutually supportive members; the primacy of non-materialistic values; the need 
to value a “serving elite” willing to devote their lives to the creation and survival 
of Israel; and the importance of “creating facts on the ground” through new com-
munities that would eventually shape the territorial borders of the Jewish state.  
The broader resonance of these themes creates sympathy and support among 
many non-settlers; perhaps more importantly, they create ambivalence and even 
reluctance among those who intellectually object to the settlement project to voice 
their opposition.  Danny Rubinstein, an Israeli author, observed that: “the slogans 
of Gush Emunim . . . penetrated the hearts of those who were distant from Juda-
ism and the National Religious Party.”
67 
1.  Biblical Themes 
The West Bank, included in the ancient Jewish kingdoms of Yehuda and Yis-
rael, is pervasively believed to be the site of many biblical stories described in the 
Old Testament.  Thought to be part of the “Promised Land,” together with Jerusa-
lem this area represents the geographical cradle of the Jewish people.  As a result, 
settling this land resonates not only with religious Israelis, but also with large 
segments of the secular majority. 
For many Jews, secular and religious alike, Israel’s stunning victory in the 
1967 war led Israelis to rediscover this ancient biblical connection.  As Gideon 
Aran suggests: 
The [1967] war reconnected the State with the Land.  The rediscovery of 
the ancient Promised Land was perhaps no less significant than the redis-
covery of Jewishness.  The return to the Land of Israel, or, more specifi-
cally, to the territories severed from the state at its establishment in 1948 
and considered to be the cradle of religion and nationhood, brought secu-
lar Zionism closer to Judaism.  In the land of the Bible the Israelis met 
the Israelites.  The return to cherished landmarks and longed-for vistas, 
pregnant with rich cultural associations, reawakened a long-dormant im-
pulse associated with the mystique of the land.  The famous photograph 
of a weeping paratrooper kissing the stones of the Western Wall is a 
symbol of the unforeseen emergence of religious motifs in contemporary 
Israel.
68 
a.  Appeal to Religious Israelis 
For religious nationalists, re-establishing a connection with the land that in 
Biblical times was home to their forefathers has special spiritual and religious 
meaning.  While living anywhere in Israel may minimally satisfy the religious 
___________________________  
 67.  DANNY RUBINSTEIN, ON THE LORD’S SIDE:  GUSH EMUNIM 162 (1982) (in Hebrew). 
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command to reside in the Promised Land, resettling the biblical areas is special:  it 
fulfills the commandment that the Jews should once again live on all parts of the 
Promised Land.  In ancient times few Jews actually resided in the coastal plains 
that comprise the center of the modern state.  Tel Aviv did not exist. 
For the minority of religious settlers who are messianic, they believe that set-
tling the ancient land provides an essential foundation necessary for the eventual 
arrival of the messiah and the commencement of a messianic era.  Messianic reli-
gious thinkers, most notably Rabbi Kook, saw the return to the land as a first step 
towards the coming of the Messiah.  By returning to the land, these settlers play 
an active role in inducing their eschatological visions.
69  
b.  Appeal to Secular Israelis  
Settling the West Bank has cultural appeal that extends to Israel’s secular ma-
jority.  Non-observant Israelis Jews are socialized to understand the importance of 
Jewish history, and the significance of the historical roots of the Jewish people.  
Even in the secular schools, the Old Testament is a required part of the curriculum 
for all Jewish children.  Children are taught the biblical narrative for its national 
and cultural significance.  Zionism, the dominant form of modern Jewish national-
ism, was primarily a secular movement.  But it always justified its claim for this 
homeland on the ground that it was the cradle of Jewish civilization and a locale 
where Jews had sovereignty for hundreds of years.  Although the modern state 
draws its international legal legitimacy from League of Nation’s recognition of the 
Balfour Declaration in 1922 and from the United Nations Partition Resolution in 
1947, a broader cultural claim based on biblical heritage has pervasive appeal 
among Israeli Jews. 
2.  Pioneering Spirit 
Aside from biblical themes, proponents of settlement in the West Bank and 
Gaza also appeal to pioneering sentiments.  In the Israeli imagination, the Jewish 
state was created through the actions, commitment, and sacrifice of early pioneers 
who immigrated to Palestine between the late nineteenth century and mid twenti-
eth century, settled in hostile lands, and through their actions laid the foundations 
for the modern state.  This narrative, and the admiration of a pioneering spirit, is 
part of Israeli cultural fabric.  Today, Israel is essentially a modern, industrial 
state.  Religious nationalists characterize their settlements as the “last frontier.”  
The pioneering spirit of these settlers reminds many other Israelis of a heroic and 
much admired earlier generation that chose to live in a hostile environment, en-
dangering their lives for a nation-building project. 
For decades, the tiny Kibbutz movement was seen as emblematic of this pio-
neering spirit.  Many Kibbutzim defined the frontier; their locations later some-
times determined what were to become Israel’s borders.  They lived a simple life, 
___________________________  
  69. While the end of their story differs, many evangelical Christians actively support the establish-
ment of Jewish settlements for a similar reason.  See Ann LoLordo, Israeli Settlers Find Staunch 
Friends in Christians, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 15, 2004, at http://www.cfoic.com/index.asp?mainpage 
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motivated by a strong commitment to the national cause.  The national religious 
settlers thought of themselves as the successors of the Kibbutz movement, which 
by the 1980s was in decline.  Some members of Kibbutzim, even though they 
were secular, saw national religious settlers in this way.  One member of a Kib-
butz wrote in the late 1970s to the national religious settlers in Elon Moreh on the 
West Bank:  “You are the true continuation of pioneering settlement.”
70  Simi-
larly, a delegation from Kibbutz Ein Harod, a flagship in the Kibbutz movement, 
came to Elon Moreh, to demonstrate its support to the settlers in December 
1976.
71 
3.  Serving Elite 
Israeli Jews have always accorded high status to the “serving elite”—those 
who dedicated their lives, notwithstanding the personal sacrifices involved, to the 
national cause.  Traditionally, Kibbutz members enjoyed this status.  Not only 
were they in the vanguard who pushed back the state’s borders, but they were also 
overrepresented in the military, the union movement, and the Knesset. National 
religious settlers see themselves as a new serving elite, and some other groups in 
Israeli society share this view.  Many appreciate that at great personal risk, na-
tional religious settlers created new communities on “barren land” in a hostile area 
in order to fulfill a biblical mandate and build a greater Israel.  For those who 
bemoan the decline of Israel’s “old values,” these settlers provide a source of in-
spiration. 
4.  Communitarian Notions 
Many feel that Israel has lost its earlier commitment to a communitarian 
ideal, in which there are tightly knit communities based on mutual responsibility 
where neighbors are committed to each other.  These communitarian notions had 
roots both in traditional Jewish values and collectivist socialist ideals.  Few doubt 
that these values are significant today in modern Israel but many regret their de-
cline.  Even opponents of the settlement project must acknowledge, however, that 
the communities created by national religious settlers retain many of these com-
munitarian values. 
5.  The Settlement Movement as the Natural Extension of Zionism 
The combination of the pioneer appeal, the notions of a serving elite, and the 
model of communitarian life all resonate for many Israeli as an extrapolation of 
traditional Zionism.  Zionism is a settler ideology.  From the 1920s until at least 
the 1950s, many thought that the essence of Zionism required the creation of set-
tlements that would reclaim the land and create a new identity for Jews connected 
to the land.  Even today, some Israelis believe that settlements are a crucial mani-
festation of Zionism. 
___________________________  
 70.  RUBINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 126. 
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The national religious settlers viewed themselves in this light.  “The peo-
ple of Gush Emunim embarked on the settlement project out of complete 
Zionist consciousness . . . they saw their project as a natural continuation 
of the Zionist move.  In their dress, they had copied the original pioneers 
of Labor Zionism:  the hair style, a shirt outside of their pants, sandals to 
their feet, weapon on their shoulder.”
72 
The national religious settlers saw themselves as reviving Zionism and rescu-
ing it from the hands of an aging and debased group of Labor Zionists
73 who were 
in decline.  Traditional Zionism was a secular movement, with socialist overtones, 
led by many who wished to rebel against traditional Judaism.  It was primarily 
political, and was focused on establishing a Jewish state.  Observant Jews had 
never been at the core of the movement, and felt marginalized.  After 1967, reli-
gious nationalists saw the settlement project as a means to create a central role in 
Zionism for themselves through the fusion of religion with old notions of territo-
rial expansion through settlement and national security.  From the caboose of the 
Zionist train, national religious Israelis moved to the front car and in the eyes of 
some seized control of the locomotive.
74  One leader of the settlement movement, 
Hanan Porat, declared that Labor Zionism “had concluded its mission” and now 
its leaders should move aside and “stop disrupting” the task of reviving Zionism 
through new settlements.
75 
By framing their role in terms of Zionism, the settlers characterize any con-
traction as undermining the entire Zionist endeavor.  They suggest that disman-
tling settlements in the Bank and Gaza would lead inexorably to the end of the 
Jewish presence in Israel.  In the words of the Yesha Council’s former secretary 
general, “Our message is that the expulsion of the Jews from the Land of Israel 
will bring about the destruction of Zionism.”
76 
B.  Institutional Sources of Settler Influence 
1.  The Israeli Political System—Coalitional Politics 
The settlers enjoy significant influence in the Israeli political system as a re-
sult of some institutional features of the system.  These are compounded by the 
internal structure of the settlement movement, which gives the most ideologically 
committed settlers disproportionate influence among the settlers as a whole. 
The Israeli political system allows small, determined, and cohesive minority 
groups to exert disproportionate power.  Israeli voters elect members of the Knes-
set not directly but by voting for a party.  For these purposes there are no geo-
___________________________  
  72. Motty Karpel, The Emunic Revolution: The Decline of Zionism and the Rise of the Emunic 
Alternative, Lehathila: Alon Shvut, 2003, p. 206.(in Hebrew). 
  73. Labor Zionists traditionally believed that a Jewish state can be created and maintained through 
the efforts of the Jewish working class on kibbutzim and in the cities.  See Avineri, supra note 40. 
  74. This metaphor is popularly attributed in Israel to the author Amos Oz, though we were unable to 
track its exact source. 
 75.  RUBINSTEIN, supra note 68, at ’’’162. 
 76. See Larry Derfner, Sharon’s Grand Plan Stirs Revolt by Jewish Settlers, THE SUNDAY TIMES—
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graphical subdivisions.  The number of seats in the Knesset allocated to each party 
reflects that party’s proportion of the total vote.  The party itself designates its list 
of potential members, prior to the election.
77  Those individuals placed closer to 
the top of a party’s list stand a better chance of being elected.  No party has ever 
received half of the total votes.  The typical pattern, therefore, involves the leader 
of the party that receives the most seats attempting to form a coalition with other 
parties so that his coalition has a majority of seats (61) out of a total of 120.  If he 
succeeds, he becomes Prime Minister.
78 
All of this means that to become Prime Minister and to govern, one must cre-
ate and retain through negotiation a coalition including several, usually smaller, 
parties that typically have different policy preferences.  Such coalitions typically 
include one major party—the Prime Minister’s party—and a number of smaller 
parties, each capable of toppling the coalition by leaving it.  This state of affairs 
forces Israeli Prime Ministers to be extremely attentive to the preferences of small 
parties that are part of their coalition, at the start to form a coalition and afterwards 
to retain their support.  Since the 1970s, in addition to Likud, smaller parties also 
supported the maintenance and growth of the settlement project.  Indeed, at most 
times since the mid-1970s one or more of these small parties were part of a gov-
erning coalition, and were able to support the settlers’ interests from within the 
government. 
In addition to non-settlers who were sympathetic to the settler movement, 
since 1981 there have been settlers who have served in the Knesset.  Most have 
been members of small, right wing parties such as Hathiya, the National Religious 
Party (NRP), or the National Union (NU) Party.  More rarely, settlers became 
members of the Knesset (MKs) as part of the Likud Party.  And as the number of 
settlers increased over time, their numbers in the Knesset increased disproportion-
ately.  Today settlers are substantially overrepresented in the Knesset: by 2003, 
9% of the members of the Knesset (11/120) were settlers,
79 even though settlers 
comprised only 3% of the electorate.  The institutional structure of Israeli politics, 
specifically the fact that a party’s Knesset members do not represent geographical 
areas but are chosen on the basis of a single party list, contributes to this outcome.  
For most parties, these lists are created and controlled by the party’s central com-
mittee.  These leadership committees, which in some instances may have a few 
hundred members, are susceptible to highly organized and cohesive groups, such 
as the settlers. 
___________________________  
 77.  BASIC LAW: THE KNESSET (Isr.), at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm. 
  78. In 1996, 1999, and 2001 the Prime Minister was elected directly.  See B ASIC  LAW:  THE 
GOVERNMENT (Isr. 1992), at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic7_eng.htm.  He nonethe-
less needed to form a coalition, the parties of which represented a majority of the Knesset.  Although 
the purpose of the change was to strengthen the Prime Minister and the authority of the government, 
that was not the perceived consequence of the change.  Because the new regime allowed “ticket-
splitting,” where people voted for a Prime Minister of one party and another party for the Knesset, the 
perception was that the Prime Minister’s authority was weakened.  In 2001, the law was changed so 
that, as before, the Prime Minister is not directly elected.  BASIC LAW:  THE GOVERNMENT (Isr. 2001), 
at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm. 
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2.  Regional, Local and the Yesha Councils 
Other structural features of the Israeli government and settlement movement 
itself contribute to the disproportionate influence of ideologically committed set-
tlers.  Those settlers who become elected officials, mostly at the local government 
level, are often willing to commit municipal and regional resources under their 
control to the settlement movement. 
In both Israel and the occupied territories, many significant governmental 
functions, including planning and zoning, the provision of roads, sewers and wa-
ter, and many social and educational services are administered by local govern-
ment entities, not the central government.  There are three types of local govern-
ment entities: “cities” for communities with a population of 20,000 or more; “lo-
cal councils” for smaller communities of 3000-20,000; and “regional councils” 
with responsibility for all the small Jewish communities within a geographical 
region that do not qualify for a local council or city form of government.
80  Most 
of the recognized settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (125 out of 140) are 
governed by one of seven regional councils (six on the West Bank and one in 
Gaza).  Fourteen larger settlements have a local council. Three large settlements 
have a “city” government. 
Regional and local councils have command over significant material and hu-
man resources that can be translated into political power.  They control the local 
payroll, a source of patronage and control.  Indeed, for Jews, government is the 
largest employer in the territories.  Local and regional councils have used their 
budgetary control to expand settlements and outposts,
81 to finance campaigns 
against settler relocation during the Oslo process, and most recently to fight the 
Sharon initiative.  Resources are also used directly for political mobilization.  For 
example, during the 2004 mass demonstrations in Israel against Prime Minister 
Sharon’s relocation plan, settler regional and local councils used their control over 
the educational and busing systems to transport thousands of schoolchildren and 
local government employees to protest against the government’s policies. Some 
regional councils transferred part of their own budgets to the Yesha council, in 
order to support its political activities. In April 2005, as part of the government’s 
effort to mitigate settler resistance to Prime Minister Sharon’s plan, the Israeli 
Minister of the Interior ordered a stop to this policy.
82  
Along with this municipal government structure, the geographic distribution 
of settler groups accounts for the disproportionate influence of the most ideologi-
cally committed settlers.  Most national religious settlers reside in, and make up a 
majority of, smaller settlements with a local or regional council government.   
___________________________  
  80. The Minister of Interior is responsible, under applicable legal standards, for deciding when a 
community can qualify for a local council or city form of government.  
81 The Sasson report showed Housing Ministry financial support provided to outposts. See Lynfield, 
supra note 60. 
82 "W. Bank Councils Told: No funds for Settler Protests", Haaretz, April 6
th, 2005, as reported by 
Peace Now, at: http://www.peacenow.org/hot.asp?cid=515 
 
 File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
22  JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION  [Vol.  
Most non-ideological settlers reside in larger communities with a “city” form of 
local government.  This has two consequences.  
First, national religious settlers are able to control most local and regional 
councils.  Second, the national religious settlers are able to control the Yesha 
Council, an institution composed of settler leaders.  Although the Yesha Council 
has no official governmental status, it has long claimed to speak for those who 
live in the settlements.  The thirty-five seats on the Yesha Council are not elected 
by popular vote.  Rather, twenty-four of the seats are given to the heads of local 
and regional councils and city governments.  The remaining eleven members are 
selected by an executive committee of Council members on the basis of “leader-
ship credentials.” 
This structure produces remarkable results.  Although the four largest settle-
ments, with a combined population of about 85,000, represent about one-third of 
the entire settler population, they have only four representatives on the Yesha 
Council.
83  A large, secular city like Ariel (with 17,000) has the same level of 
representation as Beit El, a national religious settlement with 5000.  Further, the 
council’s executive committee is comprised of seven members and presently all 
seven are national religious settlers.  This executive committee selects the eleven 
members who are not municipal officials.  This institutional structure where 
smaller settlements have disproportionate membership on the Yesha Council and 
on the executive committee guarantees that those settlers most ideologically 
committed to the settlement project will control the formal organization of settle-
ment leadership, even though they account for only 25% of the total settler popu-
lation.
84 
The settlers further benefit from continuity in their leadership.  For example, 
two of the most dominant movement leaders, Zeev Hever (Zambish) who heads 
the settlement arm of Gush Emunim (Amana), and Pinchas Vallerstein who runs 
the regional council of Binyamin, have each held their positions for over twenty 
years.
85  Other Israeli governmental institutions that directly affect the settlements 
have had much less continuity in their senior ranks.  There has been much more 
turnover among the top military leaders and the political appointees leading the 
ministries that deal with settlers.  This has worked to the advantage of the settle-
ment movement given the persistence and longevity of its leaders. 
C.  The Settlers’ Effective Use of Hard Bargaining Tactics 
The settlers have successfully played on the fear among Israelis at large that 
any attempt to evacuate settlers would result in a violent confrontation, could 
create a painful and costly internal rift among Israeli Jews, and may create a crisis 
___________________________  
  83. Two of these four settlements are secular while the other two are ultra-orthodox.  They are the 
secular settlements Ariel (population 17,555) and Ma’ale Adumim (28,546), and the ultra-Orthodox 
settlements Kiryat Sefer/Modin Ilit (27,300) and Beitar Illit (20,000).  Rali Saar and Nir Hason, The 
Number of Settlers Grew in the Last Year by 6%, Haaretz, January 9, 2005 (in Hebrew), A Town in 
Israel (Official Intrernet site of Beitar Ilit) at http://www.betar-illit.muni.il/ir.htm. 
  84. Public opinion polls suggest that most settlers do not think that the Yesha Council represents 
their views.  In one recent poll, only 26% of settlers in Judea and Samaria said that the council repre-
sents them.  MARKET WATCH, Voice of Israel, Jan. 30, 2005 (reporting on poll results). 
  85. Pinchas Vallerstein has led Binyamin since 1979, and Zeev Hever (Zambish) has led Amana 
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that would damage the principle of democratic, majority rule.  The leaders of the 
settlement movement, while typically reluctant to explicitly endorse the use of 
violent tactics, nevertheless have always been willing to exploit fears of settler 
violence in the face of evacuation.
86  For example, while leaders suggest that most 
national religious settlers are law-abiding and would never resort to violence, they 
simultaneously suggest that some extreme elements within their ranks are difficult 
to constrain.
87  The existence of extreme elements prepared to use violence is 
doubted by few Israelis, given the plot of the Jewish underground to blow up the 
Temple Mount and the Rabin assassination.
88 
Israelis are especially sensitive to the risk of internal conflict because of the 
“lessons” of history.  Even secular Jews are taught in school the Talmudic story 
indicating that Jewish independence was lost to the Romans during the Second 
Temple era (circa 70 AD) because of violent rifts and “internal hatred” among the 
Jews.
89 
Religion aside, Jewish culture has traditionally stressed a tribal notion that 
Jews throughout the world share a responsibility for each other’s well-being and 
survival.  This cultural theme makes repugnant the prospect of a violent confron-
tation among Jews.  This notion may help to explain the extreme trauma created 
by Rabin’s assassination. 
For Israelis, the “nightmare scenario” of an internal rift would involve wide-
spread insubordination within the military.  Today settlers and other religious 
nationalists are understood to be vastly overrepresented in junior officer corps and 
combat units.
90  Press reports have suggested that many of these soldiers would 
disobey orders to evacuate settlements.  Nearly all Israeli Jews believe the 
strength and cohesion of the military is essential for Israel’s survival.  No institu-
tion within Israel enjoys higher prestige than the armed forces.
91  This is hardly 
surprising given Israel’s fundamental reliance on its military over a fifty-six year 
period that has seen six wars and intermittent terrorist attacks.  The role of settlers 
___________________________  
  86. Interview with Moshe Halbertal, Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Apr. 14, 2005). 
  87. This suggestion interestingly reflects a similar argument made by leaders of the Palestinian 
authority who suggest they lack the capacity to control Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and extreme elements 
with the PLO.  
 88.  NOEMI GAL-OR, THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND:  OUR TERRORISM 39-48 (1990).  Some contempo-
rary analysts have suggested that the youth who have established new hilltop outposts cannot be con-
trolled by the settler leadership.  Shlomo Kaniel, The Hilltop Settlers:  Biblical Sabras, Presentation at 
Harvard Law School’s “Past, Present, and Future of the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza 
Settlements:  The Internal Israeli Conflict” Conference (Oct. 14, 2004)“”. 
  89. Romans destroyed the Second Temple in 70 AD.  In 132 AD the Jews unsuccessfully rebelled 
again against the Romans.  The Romans then expelled most of the Jews from the Holy Land and the 
second Diaspora began.  See FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, THE JEWISH WARS (1959); YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, 
THE BAR KOKHBA SYNDROME:  RISK AND REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1983).  See also 
Talmud, Yoma, 9B (The Second Temple was destroyed because during that time “sinat Hinam” [base-
less hatred] characterized the relationship among Jewish groups.  The Talmud concludes that “this 
teaches us that baseless hatred [among Jews] is deemed as grave as the sins of idolatry, immorality and 
bloodshed combined”). 
  90. In 1998, former Director of Military Intelligence, General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, warned that the 
large numbers of religious and settler soldiers is “dangerously politicizing the military.”  Tzahi Fanton, 
The Motherland of Antisemitism, NFC, Apr. 19, 2004, available at:http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-
D-5650-00.html?tag=4-57-59. 
 91.  See Y ARON  EZRAHI,  RUBBER  BULLETS:  POWER AND CONSCIENCE IN MODERN  ISRAEL 38 
(1998) (service in the military is “the most defining component of Israeli identity”).  File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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and religious nationalists in the military adds to the credibility of the implicit 
threat of disunity in the ranks.  Indeed, in the past some rabbis have issued edicts 
saying that soldiers should ignore certain military orders relating to the cession of 
army bases in the West Bank to the Palestinians.
92 
D.  Other Factors Contributing to Settler Power and Settlement Expansion 
Other factors, unrelated to the actions of the settlers themselves, contributed 
to the remarkable expansion of the settlements. 
1.  National Security Arguments 
a.  Border  
Over the years many believed that settlements in the West Bank enhanced Is-
rael’s security.  As noted above, among Israelis, the old “Green Line” border be-
tween Israel and the West Bank was deemed impossible to defend from an eastern 
military attack.  Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban—who had a reputation as a 
“dove”—labeled it “the Auschwitz Border” because it risked extermination of 
Israel—the neck of Israel was less than ten miles wide.  Many believed that by 
“creating facts on the ground,” settlements might enhance Israel’s long-term secu-
rity by ultimately guaranteeing that any future eastern border would be east of the 
Green Line.
93 
Whatever the final borders, many Israelis believe that maintaining control 
over portions of the West Bank is essential until there is a stable Palestinian gov-
ernment which could insure that there would be no cross-border terrorist attacks 
and that the West Bank aquifer would not be contaminated.
94  Even among some 
leaders of the Labor Party, such as Yigal Alon, settlements were a vital method of 
insuring interim control.
95  Settlements could house military units, and could cre-
ate a continuing presence in a strategic location.  However, the effectiveness of 
civilian settlements in asserting military control is disputed.  Many analysts argue 
that civilian presence in the territory compromises military control, because civil-
ian settlers need extra military protection and divert scarce military resources. 
b.  The Settlements as a Bargaining Chip 
After Israel took control of the territories, it was widely assumed that Israel 
would some day trade land for peace in a future negotiated deal with its neighbor-
ing Arab states or the Palestinians.  However, with the exception of Egypt, be-
___________________________  
 92.  Joel  Greenberg,  Hand Over Israeli Bases? No Way, Rabbis Tell Troops, N.Y.TIMES, July 13, 
1995, at 3. 
  93. Another area where settlements are thought to contribute to Israeli security was the Gush Etzion 
area, south of Jerusalem.  In hostile hands, control of this area would facilitate attacks on Jerusalem.  
  94. Some security analysts suggest that Israel should control at least part of the West Bank because 
the West Bank aquifer, if contaminated, would compromise Israel’s main water supply.   
  95. As early as June 19, 1967, Labor Minister Alon stated “we should create facts through settle-
ments . . . if an area is not settled we are not really holding it.”  Reuven Pedhatzur, THE TRIUMPH OF 
EMBARRASMENT: ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR 50 (in Hebrew). File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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tween 1967 to 1991, there were no formal negotiations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors.  Shortly after the Six Day War, the Israeli cabinet suggested that it was 
prepared to trade land for peace with its Arab neighbors.  At an Arab League 
summit at Khartoum in September of 1967, the response was three no’s:  “No 
peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel [and] no negotiations with Israel.”
96 
Within Israel, many who had no interest in permanently remaining in the ter-
ritories either supported or acquiesced in the creation of settlements for two rea-
sons.  On the one hand, the threat of on-going settlement expansion might create a 
“fading opportunity” that could induce the Arabs to come to the bargaining table.  
On the other hand, some believed that at the bargaining table itself, the settlements 
could serve as a “bargaining chip” that could be traded for an Arab concession.  
There is an obvious tension between these arguments. The opportunity is “fading” 
only to the extent that settlement expansion is seen as irreversible.  Moreover, the 
use of the settlements as a bargaining chip in negotiation requires the Israeli gov-
ernment to have the capacity to require evacuation of the settlers.  The experience 
of the last twenty years suggests neither argument has panned out.  On the one 
hand, the constant expansion of settlements appears to have undermined and in-
hibited negotiations with the Palestinians.  On the other, the existence of the set-
tlements has in fact made it very difficult for any Israeli leader to create and sus-
tain sufficient domestic support to abandon them.  The settlers have not been pas-
sive pieces on a strategic chessboard; they have in fact played an active role as 
spoilers, resisting all internal political efforts to reach an Israeli-Palestinian deal. 
2.  The Status of the Territories 
The settlers benefited from the unclear status of the West Bank and Gaza, as 
well as the ongoing inability—until 1993—to determine their future status.  Israel 
occupied both areas in 1967, but never annexed them, and legally ruled them un-
der a temporary military legal system.  But even prior to Israeli occupation, sover-
eignty over these regions was not internationally agreed upon. 
The issue goes back to the early days of the state of Israel.  Since 1948, with 
the end of the British Mandate, no state acquired internationally recognized sover-
eignty over these areas.  Though under the 1947 United Nationss Partition Plan 
Gaza and the West Bank were supposed to be part of a future Palestinian state, by 
the end of the 1948-1949 war, they were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respec-
tively.  Egypt held Gaza under military rule between the years 1949-1967, and 
never annexed it.  Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, but the international 
community did not recognize the annexation.
97  Though it was widely assumed in 
Israel that the territories would be handed to an Arab party at some point, for at 
least twenty-five years, it was not clear whom this party would be.  Until 1987 
Jordan claimed that the West Bank was part of the Hashemite Kingdom.  Follow-
ing the 1993 Oslo accord it was assumed that a Palestinian state would have sov-
___________________________  
  96. Jewish Virtual Library, A Division of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, The Khar-
toum Resolutions (Sept. 1, 1967), available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/ 
three_noes.html. 
  97. Two countries, the United Kingdom and Pakistan, were alone in recognizing this annexation. File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on:  4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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ereignty of the region, but the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000 once again 
created uncertainty. 
The Palestinians, the local residents of these areas, did not articulate a clear 
and effective demand for self-determination until the 1970s, and even then the 
demand was deemed unrealistic by many, as it included an undistinguishable 
claim for both the territories and the state of Israel.  These circumstances created a 
political vacuum in the West Bank and Gaza that both made it easier for settlers to 
pursue their project and create “facts on the ground” without substantial internal 
opposition. 
3.  Absence of a Deal 
The settlers greatly benefited from the absence of a final status deal between 
Israelis and Palestinians.  At no point in time was the Israeli public faced directly 
with a choice between the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians; they did not have to evaluate the trade-offs be-
tween the two.  For the first twenty-five years of the settlement project, neither 
Israelis nor Palestinians accepted the legitimacy of the other’s right of self-
determination, let alone a negotiated deal.  Though both sides negotiated and 
signed a set of agreements in the 1993-2000 Oslo peace process period, it was 
only in 2000 in the Camp David and Taba negotiations that Israel and the PLO got 
closer to discussing a comprehensive final deal which would have crystallized the 
choice between land and peace.  Even then, as we discussed above, a deal was not 
reached and the public was not asked to make a choice between peace and the 
settlement project. 
Although the Israeli public was not asked to choose between the settlements 
and peace during the Oslo peace process, Israel’s short history provides one vivid 
example of majority support for halting or uprooting a settlement project when a 
concrete peace plan was on the table.  In 1982, the Israeli Knesset authorized the 
relocation of 6000 Israeli settlers in Sinai, as part of an Israeli-Egyptian peace 
agreement.  Yet the public has never had to make a direct choice between settle-
ments and peace in the West Bank and Gaza, and they did not have a strong incen-
tive to halt the settlement project.
98 
Many Israelis, as well as Palestinians, warned that the continuation of the set-
tlement project would create enormous difficulties for a future peace agreement.  
But with the lack a final status agreement, their warnings were ignored. 
___________________________  
  98. Moreover, public opinion data provide inconclusive evidence of the Israeli public’s appetite for 
other land-for-peace deals.  Polling data show that withdrawing from the Golan Heights in exchange 
for peace with Syria has not mustered the support of a majority of Israelis.  See Ephraim Yaar & Tamar 
Hermann, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research Report, Peace Index (Dec. 1999) (stating the 
“Jewish public at this time lacks a majority in favor of full withdrawal from the Golan in return for a 
full peace agreement with Syria”), at http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindex/1999/files/dec99e. 
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IV.  THE SHARON PLAN 
A.  What Is the Plan? 
Although a withdrawal from settlements was not negotiated with the Pales-
tinians as part of a peace agreement, on December 18, 2003 Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon suggested without being specific that Israel should “unilaterally dis-
engage” from some occupied areas that were presently under Israeli control but 
were heavily populated by Palestinians (the “Herzliya Speech”).
99  Sharon made 
clear that this would require the relocation of some Israeli settlements that in his 
view would never “be included in the territory of the state of Israel in the frame-
work of any possible future permanent agreement.”
100  Within weeks Sharon more 
precisely defined the scope of his initiative to include all of Gaza and a small por-
tion of the West Bank in the northern portion of Samaria.  This would require the 
evacuation of seventeen settlements
101 in Gaza as well as four small settlements in 
the West Bank.  The Prime Minister asked the Israeli National Security Council to 
initiate a governmental process to plan for relocation.  The Ministry of Justice was 
assigned the task of drafting legislation to authorize the evacuation and provide 
for compensation of those settlers who would be required to move. 
From the outset the proposal was highly controversial.  Initially, some on the 
left objected to its unilateral nature, its limited scope, and the fact that it was tied 
to the creation of a fence.  But the real opposition was from the settlement com-
munity and the right.
102  Many settlers had a profound sense of betrayal because 
Sharon, long their champion, had radically reversed his position without prior 
consultation or explanation.  Settler opponents mounted process objections to the 
manner in which the proposal was made and to the power of the government to 
carry it out, and substantive objections to the contents of the plan itself.  First, they 
suggested that Sharon had no right in terms of legitimacy to make such a proposal.  
He, after all, had been the champion of the settlers since the 1970s, and his elec-
tion campaigns in both 2001 and 2003 had vehemently and categorically rejected 
abandoning any settlements.
103  Settlers have argued that no settlement should be 
evacuated without a prior election or a referendum.  They have also argued that 
evacuating these settlements would jeopardize Israeli security, and profoundly and 
unfairly disrupt the lives of those who would be required to move.  Moreover, 
___________________________  
 99.  Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech at the Herzliya Conference (Dec. 20, 2003), at 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=373673&contrassID=1. 
 100. Id.  Sharon also re-affirmed his intention to construct a fence in the West Bank that he claimed 
would diminish the risk of Palestinian terrorism.  Id.  Some large settlements would be on the “Israeli 
side” of the fence, but many smaller settlements would not.  Sharon indicated that the placement of the 
fence would not determine the border in any final status agreement that might someday be negotiated.  
Id. 
 101. There are either seventeen or nineteen settlements in Gaza, depending on whether two small 
adjacent neighborhoods are counted as a separate settlement.  
 102. Settler objection to the plan has not been monolithic; poll data from Judea and Samaria settlers 
who would not have to evacuate show that just under one third support Sharon’s plan.  And, among 
opponents of the plan, 14% said that it must be obeyed.  MARKET WATCH, Voice of Israel, Jan. 30, 
2005 (reporting on poll results). 
 103. In his 2003 campaign, Sharon had rhetorically claimed he would no sooner evacuate Netzarim, a 
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they pointed out that for this sacrifice Israel was receiving no quid pro quo from 
the Palestinians. 
To counter this opposition, Sharon tactically decided to ask his own party—
the Likud—to hold a referendum in which only Likud Party members could par-
ticipate.  In the meantime, he negotiated with the United States to secure an ex-
change of letters suggesting that the Americans would not ever require Israel to 
abandon certain settlement blocks near the Green Line.
104  Nevertheless, Sharon’s 
plan was soundly defeated on May 2 in the Likud referendum, 60% to 40%.  Un-
daunted, Sharon thereafter suggested he was not bound by the referendum.  He 
made modest modifications, and presented it to his cabinet for approval on June 6, 
2004.  Realizing that he might not have a majority of his own cabinet, he fired two 
ministers, both settlers, who opposed the plan.  Thereafter, the Israeli Cabinet 
approved the Prime Minister’s plan.
105 
In the fall of 2004, after an initial symbolic vote rejecting Sharon’s statement 
convening the legislative session, the Knesset on October 25 approved in principle 
the plan by a vote of sixty-seven to forty-five.  The left supported the initiative, 
but some members of Sharon’s own party voted against it.  Thereafter, the Knes-
set enacted the necessary legislation authorizing the disengagement and providing 
compensation to the relocated settlers through the three required votes.
106 In the 
meantime, it was becoming clear that the coalition that had provided the founda-
tion for Sharon’s government was crumbling because two right-wing parties and 
several Likud ministers who disagreed with the initiative were withdrawing their 
support for the government.  Like a cat with nine lives, Sharon moved to create a 
“national unity government” with Labor.  The Likud central committee initially 
refused to join forces with Labor, but later relented.  Opponents of Sharon’s plan 
continued to try to erect legislative roadblocks. They attempted to enact a law that 
would have made a referendum a precondition to evacuation. In March 2005, 
Sharon was able to defeat this proposal in the Knesset.  The last legislative effort 
concerned the budget.  Under Israeli law, if the Knesset fails to enact a budget by 
March 31 of any year, the government falls and there must be new elections. 
___________________________  
 104. Sharon received a letter from United States President Bush (which was later endorsed by Con-
gress) in which Bush declared, in effect, that the United States recognized that some of the settlements 
in the West Bank would remain under Israeli control in any final status agreement.  Letter from George 
W. Bush, President, United States of America, to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel (Apr. 14, 
2004), at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/bushletter.html.  The letter also hints 
that the United States might assist Israel in some of the costs of relocation.  Id.  Bush’s letter for the 
first time made explicit a possible change in a long-standing United States’ policy that had never 
recognized the legitimacy of Israeli settlement activity.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that former 
United States’ President Clinton oral suggestions in December of 2000 had implicitly done this by 
suggesting the possible annexation of some unspecified settlements near the Green Line in exchange 
for consideration to be negotiated.  See Ross, supra note 1, at 801-805. 
 105. In order to appease his opponents in the party, Sharon modified the plan to require a withdrawal 
in four steps, which each step requiring a further Cabinet approval.  He also agreed to leave no Israeli 
property improvements behind.   
 106. For enactment, Israeli legislation requires approval in three separate votes.  Sharon’s plan re-
ceived this approval. Gideon Alon and Zvi Zerhia, Relocation and Compensation Law Approved 
59:40, Haaretz, February 16th, 2005 available at 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=540551&contrassID=1 (in Hebrew). File: Complete April 11 2005.doc  Created on: 4/12/2005 5:27:00 PM  Last Printed: 4/13/2005 1:04:00 PM 
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Sharon surmounted this final legislative hurdle when the Knesest passed a budget 
for the coming fiscal year.
107  
 
B.  Why It Should Be Easy? 
One might have thought Sharon’s plan could easily be implemented.  First, 
Sharon’s plan would require only 8000 of some 230,000 settlers to relocate.  The 
settlers who would be relocated would be compensated in amounts that exceeded 
their economic loss.  Moreover, Sharon primarily proposed to evacuate Gaza, 
which has no special religious significance.  Furthermore, the four small West 
Bank settlements were very small, geographically isolated, and had been inhabited 
by “non-ideological” settlers.
108  Finally, the American assurance might be seen as 
making more likely Israel’s ability to retain those settlements near the Green Line.  
Sharon no doubt believed that together these elements would divide the settlers, 
and limit substantially the resistance from the settler community and those who 
are sympathetic to them.  These features also explain why Sharon has enjoyed 
overwhelming support in the polls ever since he launched his plan. 
Sharon never spelled out how his initiative fit into a broader long-term strat-
egy.  He never provided any details of his vision of a “final status” deal with the 
Palestinians.  He may have believed that this ambiguity would permit him to gar-
nish support on both the right, the left, and from the United States.  He could ap-
peal to the right by celebrating the American assurance and emphasizing that the 
Cabinet decision stressed a commitment to retain control of settlements in the 
West Bank.  He was able to appeal to the left because his initiative would demon-
strate that Israel was capable of dismantling settlements.  Moreover, it would rep-
resent an important precedent.  Indeed, Ehud Olmert—a minister known to be 
very close to Sharon—hinted that this initiative might be followed by a far larger 
withdrawal from the West Bank.  In these ways, it could be seen as contributing to 
the peace process.  With the United States, by suggesting that this initiative was 
consistent with the road map and an eventual two-state solution, Sharon was able 
to extract a concession from the United States government that would ease 
Sharon’s domestic political opposition.  In a letter written by President Bush to 
Prime Minister Sharon, the American president wrote that:  
As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recog-
nized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the par-
ties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.  In light of new 
realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli popula-
tions centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 
1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have 
___________________________  
107 Zvi Zerhia, Budget Approved, Netanyahu: I will continue to Work with Sharon Haaretz, March 
29th, 2005 available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/558288.html (in Hebrew). 
 108. Two of these West Bank settlements had already suffered substantial declines in population.  It 
should be noted, however, that in an effort to block Sharon’s plan, national religious settlers began to 
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reached the same conclusion.  It is realistic to expect that any final status 
agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes 
that reflect these realities.
109 
C.  Sharon’s Difficulties and Its Relationship to the Settlers 
Because of the settlers’ political efficacy, Sharon faced fierce political resis-
tance to his initiative in his coalition government and within Likud.  
The leadership of the settlement movement mobilized their entire settlement 
constituency, not just those 8000 that might be required to move.  To all the set-
tlers, the leadership indicated that Sharon’s initiative was a dangerous precedent, 
and that it would be a precursor for much more substantial steps.  The leadership 
was able to:  (1) recruit tens of thousands of settlers for demonstrations and for 
door-to-door grass-roots campaigning; (2) create dissent among the Likud MKs; 
and (3) encourage the withdrawal of two parties from Sharon’s original coalition 
government. 
The settlers proved to be highly effective grassroots organizers.  Before the 
May 2, 2004 Likud Party referendum, the settler Yesha Council orchestrated a 
nationwide effort, in which settlers met in person with tens of thousands of Likud  
Party members, in order to persuade them to vote against Sharon’s plan.  The 
settlers further organized a number of rallies in Israel’s biggest cities, in which 
tens of thousands of Israelis protested against Sharon’s plan. 
Sharon faced other challenges within Likud from the “Jewish Leadership 
Group,” a small, well-organized group of settlers, lead by Moshe Feiglin.  This 
small, very determined group was highly effective in mobilizing opposition vot-
ing.  During the referendum process their organizational efforts contributed to the 
overwhelming vote against the initiative.  In September, they succeeded (at least 
for a while) in persuading the Likud central committee not to form a unity gov-
ernment with Labor.  In addition, the settlers were able to organize a “Yesha” 
Lobby of Likud MKs who supported the settler cause.
110  
Two of Sharon’s original coalition partners, the National Religious Party, and 
the National Union Party, represented the interests of the settler community.  Sev-
eral members of the Knesset affiliated with these parties were themselves settlers.  
When both parties objected to the plan and finally left the coalition, Sharon was 
forced to turn left in order to secure support for his plan.   
As we write, one cannot know for certain whether Sharon’s plan will be im-
plemented.  While they did not succeed in bringing down Sharon’s government, 
the determination of the settlers cannot be doubted.  They believe their backs are 
“to the wall” and they have demonstrated their willingness to use hard bargaining 
tactics.  Once their ordinary political options are exhausted, the leaders have indi-
cated they will call for massive civil disobedience, and to make the government 
“fill the jails” with protesters.
111  Many fear a violent confrontation.  Concern 
about insubordination in the army has already had an impact on the specifics of 
___________________________  
 109. Letter from George W. Bush, President, United States of America, to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minis-
ter of Israel (Apr. 14, 2004), at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/bushletter.html. 
 110. At one point, it appeared that eighteen out of forty Likud MK’s were members of this group. 
 111. Letter from Pinchas Vallerstein, to the settlers of Mate Binyamin Regional Council, ’(Dec. 20, 
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Sharon’s plan.  Unlike the evacuation of settlers from Sinai in 1982 where Sharon 
himself as Minister of Defense deployed the regular Israeli Army, this time 
Sharon the Prime Minister has decided to use the police, backed up by career mili-
tary personnel, for the evacuation.
112  
In some respects, the internal political game now being played out over the 
Sharon Plan resembles a game of “Chicken.”   In the internal bargaining, each side 
is saying to the other—“Don’t you realize we risk a disastrous collision unless you 
change direction?”  Each wonders how far the other side is willing to go.  The 
national religious settlers have credibly created a reputation for never backing 
down.  But so has Sharon.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The history of the internal conflict over the settlements can be seen as a po-
litical contest for the hearts and minds of a reluctant and ambivalent majority 
where the protagonists are two warring minorities.  One minority, led by the na-
tional religious settlers, has shaped events to a much greater degree than the sec-
ond minority, the peace movement led by Peace Now.  The settlers have effec-
tively mobilized government resources in their service, especially when Likud 
was in power; “Peace Now” was less effective in ever mobilizing Labor govern-
ments to block settlement expansion.  Indeed, the settlement movement has suc-
ceeded in creating “facts on the ground” that profoundly complicate the imple-
mentation of a two state solution:  140 settlement communities, home to some 
231,000 Jews, now pepper the West Bank and Gaza.  Our essay has described the 
sources of the settlement movement’s remarkable influence.  We have suggested 
that this small, determined and well-organized minority has successfully invoked 
themes, both cultural and religious, that have broad resonance within Israel.  We 
have also pointed to institutional features of the Israeli political system that have 
amplified their power. 
As we have shown, West Bank and Gaza settlements have expanded steadily 
since the 1967 war, irrespective of whether Labor or Likud led the Israeli govern-
ment. However, Israel’s two major political parties responded differently to the 
conflicts between national religious settlers and the peace movement.  As a gen-
eral proposition, Labor-led governments employed a strategy of avoiding direct 
confrontation with the settlement movement.  These governments demonstrated 
little understanding or sympathy for the perspective of the national religious set-
tlers, but they were unwilling to firmly halt expansion.  Conflict avoidance charac-
terized their response.  When Likud-led governments were in power, their posture 
was one of accommodation of the settlers.  Likud demonstrated an empathetic 
understanding of the settlers’ goals, and actively supported settlement expansion.  
While territorial expansion was consistent with Likud’s traditional ideology, Li-
kud governments were never assertive enough to implement the settlers’ grand 
vision and annex the territories to Israel proper.  
___________________________  
 112. A conscripted soldier who disobeyed an evacuation order might, as a practical matter, risk a 
short term in a military jail.  The cost for a career soldier would be much higher because such a person 
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Prime Minister Sharon, once the champion of the settlers, now directly con-
fronts the movement with a specific proposal to evacuate all the settlements in 
Gaza as well as four small ones in the West Bank.  In doing so, he has been nei-
ther a conflict avoider nor an accommodator but has been characteristically asser-
tive.  We wish to suggest that Israel would be best served in the months to come if 
its government combined empathy with assertiveness in dealing with the set-
tlers.
113 
In confronting the settlement movement, the need for assertiveness and firm-
ness is obvious if Sharon’s plan is to be implemented.  The national religious set-
tlers are a small, and committed group that stands to suffer a great loss if the relo-
cation plan succeeds.  Beyond the 8000 settlers that will be evacuated immedi-
ately, implementation of the Sharon plan will set a precedent, making it easier to 
relocate more settlers from the West Bank.  The national religious settlers have 
proven their effectiveness in blocking threatening political initiatives, and have 
demonstrated a willingness to employ hard-ball tactics, including calls for massive 
civil disobedience, proposals that soldiers disobey orders, and even veiled threats 
of violence. 
Less obvious, perhaps, is the need for the government (and the nation as a 
whole) to demonstrate empathy for the settlers’ plight.
114  If only material issues 
were involved in the conflict over the settlements, economic theory suggests 
monetary compensation alone might suffice.  Presumably a majority of Israelis 
would benefit from removing the settlements if it contributed to resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  A few Israelis—the settlers who would be moved—
would be materially harmed.  If relocation were value creating, then a sufficiently 
large “side payment” to the settlers by the majority would resolve the internal 
conflict.  While there might well be hard bargaining about the amount of the pay-
ment, a negotiation analyst would predict that rational actors would make a deal. 
As we have shown, the loss many settlers will suffer cannot be translated into 
monetary terms.  For some settlers, evacuation threatens their life’s project and 
undermines their religious and cultural worldview.  It damages their personal, 
communal, and national identities.  Consequently, the government’s response 
should demonstrate an understanding of the profound non-monetary dimensions 
of their loss as well.  The government should acknowledge the sacrifice they are 
being asked to make, and perhaps later recognize it through public commemora-
tion, possibly through memorials or museums.  The spirit of what we are suggest-
ing was partially captured in a remarkable speech given by Ami Ayalon to a peace 
rally in Tel Aviv.  Ayalon, a retired admiral who headed the Israeli navy and 
served as head of Israel’s national security agency, was a principal author of the 
___________________________  
 113. See Robert H. Mnookin, Afterward to the Conference Report:  Resolving the Behind-the-Table 
Conflict, April 2005 Negotiation J. 259-262.  For the full report on the conference, see generally 
Robert H. Mnookin, Conference Report: The Internal Israeli Conflict: The Past, Present, and Future 
of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements, April 2005 Negotiation J. 165-262. 
 114. The original Sharon coalition included two parties that represent, at least in part, the interests of 
the national-religious settlers (National Union and National Religious Party).  Yet, as the plan pro-
gressed, both parties left the coalition, leaving only a few Likud MK’s, as possible institutional plat-
form for empathy.  It remains to be seen how much the appointment of a national religious Jew (but 
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Ayalon-Nuseibeh peace initiative.
115  In explaining that the Israeli peace move-
ment had made an error, Ayalon said: 
We never created a real dialogue.  Perhaps we never really wanted to.  
We turned the settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza into enemies.  We ar-
rogantly turned them out.  We monopolized the quest for peace.  That is 
why the majority did not come here [today], although I know that today 
of all days they wanted to come . . . . [The] majority wants to leave Gaza 
as much as we do.  But they want to do so after lowering the national flag 
to half-mast, observing a minute’s silence, and wiping a tear at the shat-
tering of their Zionist dream.  [The] majority will feel connected to us 
only when the pain of those slated to be evacuated drowns out the rejoic-
ing of those who will do the evacuating.
116 
In addition to acknowledgment of the loss, consideration might also be given 
to what Yair Sheleg has characterized as “ideological compensation.”
117  As we 
have shown, the settlement project has been driven by a group—national religious 
settlers—who offer a vision regarding the role of religion in the Israeli public 
sphere, fused with a modern interpretation of traditional Zionist values.  The na-
tional religious settlers view the settlement project as an instrument to implement 
their vision of infusing religious and communitarian values more broadly into 
Israeli life and moving more purposefully towards a less materialistic, more spiri-
tual, messianic age.  It is not clear to us that government policy can contribute 
much toward the achievement of such goals, although some would value symbolic 
declarations.  The Israeli government could enact laws imposing more strictly 
traditional religion in the Israeli public sphere.  Examples might include eliminat-
ing all commercial activity on the Sabbath and imposing strict kosher dietary re-
strictions in all restaurants and hotels.  Such proposals are sure to meet fierce re-
sistance from many secular Jews, however. 
Even if ideological compensation does not prove possible, empathy and ac-
knowledgment would serve practical political purposes.  While the most commit-
ted settlers will never willingly relocate, a combination of monetary compensation 
and a sympathetic national embrace is more likely to minimize the number of 
settlers willing to resort to extreme measures in expressing their opposition.   
Equally important, the government’s demonstration of empathy will be valued by 
the vast number of Israelis for whom the movement has some appeal.  Many who 
favor evacuation have an emotional understanding of the loss the settlers will 
incur.  Empathy can help build and maintain support among the reluctant majority. 
At the outset of this essay, we noted the paradoxical quality of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  While the outline of a deal that would better serve the inter-
est of most Israelis and most Palestinians is clear, the Israeli government and Pal-
estinian representatives have been unable to reach such an agreement.  After the 
___________________________  
 115. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
  116.  Ami Ayalon, Speech at Peace Rally in Rabin Square Tel Aviv (May 15, 2004), at 
http://www.btvshalom.org/geneva/majority051504.shtml. 
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collapse of Camp David and the advent of the second intifada, a vast majority of 
Israelis both blamed the failure to reach a deal on Yasser Arafat, and agreed that 
he could no longer be a legitimate negotiating “partner” across the table.  Since 
the lecture on which this paper is based was given, Arafat has died.  Palestinians 
successfully held a peaceful election, and Abu Mazen, a moderate, is now the 
elected head of the Palestinian Authority.  These events are widely perceived as 
creating circumstances that may make across-the-table negotiations genuinely 
feasible.  But our analysis strongly suggests that progress in the resolution of the 
conflicts “behind the table” remain an important condition for success across the 
table.  In the coming months, the internal Israeli conflict over the settlements is 
likely to become more conspicuous and more intense.  Now, more than ever, con-
flicts within Israel can stand in the way of substantial agreement between the par-
ties. 
 